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FACTORS-TOBACCO WAREHOUSEMEN-CONVERSION OF MORTGAGED PROP-
ERTY-An action was brought in the United States District Court,
Eastern District of Kentucky, by the United States as mortgagee against
a Kentucky tobacco warehouse company for conversion of mortgaged
tobacco. In 1952 the plaintiff loaned $2600.00 to the mortgagors.
In 1955 the mortgagors, as security for this loan, executed to the
plaintiff a crop and chattel mortgage which was duly recorded in the
county in Indiana in which the mortgagors resided and in which the
crops were to be raised. The mortgagors raised a crop of tobacco
during 1955 and consigned it, without knowledge or consent of the
plaintiff mortgagee, to the defendant's warehouse in Kentucky, there
to be sold. The defendant, having no actual notice of the mortgage,
sold the tobacco in the regular course of business and accounted to
the mortgagors for the proceeds. No accounting having been made
to the plaintiff-mortgagee by the mortgagors nor anyone on their
behalf, it brought this action seeking to recover the proceeds of the
sale from defendant-warehousemen. Defendant relied solely upon
the earlier Kentucky case of Abernathy &c Long v. Wheeler, Mills, &
Co.1 in which the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that where a to-
bacco warehouseman receives tobacco from the apparent owner and,
having no interest therein himself, sells it in the ordinary course of
business and pays the proceeds over to the consignor without knowl-
edge or information of a claim adverse to that of the consignor, he is
not liable, as for a conversion, to one holding a recorded mortgage
on the tobacco. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment
and the court gave judgment for the plaintiff for the amount claimed.
United States v. Covington Independent Tobacco Warehouse Com-
pany, 152 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Ky. 1957).
The court in ruling as it did properly concluded that Kentucky
law should be binding upon it in this case 2 But the court went on to
conclude that it should not apply the rule of the Abernathy case to
the facts before it. Instead it chose to apply the generally accepted
rule that a factor or commission merchant who receives property from
his principal, sells it under the principal's instructions and pays to
him the proceeds of the sale is guilty of conversion if the principal
had no right to sell the property; and cannot escape liability to the
true owner by claiming to have acted in good faith in ignorance of
the principal's lack of dear title.3 For rejecting the Abernathy case
the court gave three reasons: (1) The rule contravenes certain gen-
192 Ky. 320, 17 S.W. 858 (1891).
2 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
3 22 Am. Jur., "Factors", sec. 48 (1939).
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erally accepted principles of law in force in this jurisdiction (i. e.,
the rule set out immediately above). (2) Changes in the tobacco trade
and in communication and transportation facilities make the rule no
longer desirable. (8) The Kentucky Legislature overruled the case
by enacting Kentucky Revised Statute4 382.630.
A moment's reflection will reveal that neither of the first two
reasons, nor both combined, could possibly justify a Federal Court's
refusal to apply, to the facts before it a decision by the highest court
of the state in which it sits. The Kentucky court, in deciding the
Abernathy case took into consideration the generally accepted rule
mentioned in the present case and determined that tobacco warehouse-
men should be excepted from the operation of that rule in certain
circumstances. It clearly based its decision on its conception of what
would be in the interest of the tobacco trade and commercial life in
general and affirmed that decision subsequently.5 Thus the present
court should have followed that case unless the third reason, the
conclusion that it was overruled by the enactment of KRS 382.630,
is correct. It is upon this latter conclusion that the validity of the
decision must ultimately rest.
This conclusion, so necessary to the court's holding, was reached
by first stating that the Abernathy case was in reality a construction
of Kentucky General Statute, 1887, ch. 24, sec. 10,6 which provided:
No deed of trust or mortgage, conveying a legal or equit-
able title to real or personal estate, shall be valid against a purchaser
for a valuable consideration, without notice thereof, or against
creditors, until such deed shall be acknowledged or proved according
to law, and lodged for record.
The court then went on to state that the statute became inadequate
and needed an addition to conform to modern times and that the
Kentucky Legislature, acting in the light of the court's decision in the
Abernathy case and for the purpose of changing the law, enacted7
what is now KRS 382.630 which provides:
Priority of mortgage lien. The lien of any chattel mortgage
which has been lawfully executed and filed for record shall be
entitled to priority in all respects over any unrecorded conditional
sales contract or any mortgage, lien or encumbrance which has not
been filed with the proper recording officer, and shall be valid and
effective in all respects against the mortgagor, existing or subsequent
creditors of the mortgagor, and any and all third persons.
4 Hereafter referred to as ICRS.
5 Sidwell v. Cincinnati Leaf Tobacco Warehouse Co., 23 K.L.R. 1501, 65
S.W. 436 (1901); Fields v. Blane, 18 K.L.R. 675, 37 S.W. 850 (1896).
6 Hereafter referred to as sec. 10.
7IKy. Acts, 1934, ex. ses., ch. 1, see. 3.
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That the legislature, when it enacted KRS 382.630, was attempt-
ing to legislate in the light of that earlier decision certainly tests one's
'credulity when it is considered that this section was part of an overall
codification of chattel mortgage law, that the case in question was
over forty years old at the time of the enactment, and that Sec. 10,
supposedly the basis of that decision, was not abolished by the new
act but continues to exist, having been carried forward by the re-
visors into KRS 383.270. Furthermore, during the forty-three years
which transpired between the Abernathy case and the new enactment,
the legislature twice approved the court's construction, if any, of
the older statute. The first such approval which came at a legisla-
tive session commencing later in the same year of the Abernathy
decision, was in the form of a total re-enactment of Sec. 10 in con-
junction with other sections.8 Then in 1916 the legislature made
detailed revision within Sec. 10, considering that section separately
and individually.9 Significantly, the only changes which were made
consisted of inserting the words "or mortgage" after "such deed" and
before "shall be acknowledged" and adding a definition of "credi-
tors." This was an even more obvious approval of whatever con-
struction the courts had placed on that statute (which has not yet
been repealed). Thus, if the Abernathy case was a construction of
that section, how can it be said that it was to overrule such construc-
tion that the Legislature enacted KRS 382.630 forty-three years later,
when in fact it had twice approved the construction at a time when
the case was more recent, the issue more alive?
Further evidence of the fact that the Legislature was not legislat-
ing in the light of the Abernathy case, nor any case for that matter,
is the statement which the Legislature appended as Sec. 19 of the
enactment 10 and which declared an emergency to exist and made the
statute effective immediately upon its passage and approval by the
Governor. The emergency thus declared to exist was the evil sought
to be remedied.
The emergency was two-fold. In 1934, Kentucky, along with the
Test of the country, found itself in the midst of a serious economic
depression. Money was scarce and frequently the farmer could ob-
tain money to plant next year's crops only by borrowing it and giving
security therefor. But what security could he give if his farm and
other property were already mortgaged to the limit as was the usual
case? The most obvious security for money borrowed to enable the
8 Ky. Acts, 1891-1893, ch. 186, sec. 7, p. 829.
9 Ky. Acts, 1916, ch. 41, p. 434.
10 Note 7, supra.
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borrower to produce a crop would be the crop itself or whatever
machinery and equipment the borrower intended to purchase as an
aid to the production of such crops. But here the farmer and money-.
lender were frustrated by the second phase of the problem. A mort-
gage of after-acquired property, including crops not yet in existence,
was void."1 The only security afforded to the mortgagee by such
instruments was that once the property had come into existence or into
the hands of the mortgagor, the mortgagee might go into equity and
enforce it as a contract to assign the property, provided other rights
had not intervened. Beyond this it had no effect at all.'2 Obviously
the governmental agencies established to assist the farmer could not
advance money on such inadequate security.
It was in response to these inadequacies that the legislature pro-
fesses to have enacted KRS 382.600-990. The intention was to make
mortgages of future crops and other after-acquired property valid
and to provide a uniform system of recordation,13 thereby giving the
farmer new security upon which to borrow money. It removed the
necessity of the mortgagee's having to rush into equity and get the
first decree after the property came into existence in order to have
priority over later purchasers, mortgagees, creditors, assignees, ad-
ministrators or executors, or other third persons who might make
some claim to the property which claim formerly would have super-
seded the rights of the mortgagee of after-acquired property. This
new statute put mortgages of after-acquired property on an equal.
footing with other chattel mortgages and made the federal agencies
more willing to accept them as security. This is what was intended.
It was not necessary to the accomplishment of this end that the rule
of the Abernathy case be overruled. That rule had not hampered the
security value of mortgages on existing property to which it had
always applied with equal force. The legislature set out its purpose
very dearly, and the destruction of the court-created exception to the
ordinary common law rules of conversion was not one of those pur-
poses.
Admittedly KRS 383.630 as it now stands does state that "The
lien of any chattel mortgage which has been lawfully executed and
filed for record.. . shall be valid and effective in all respects against
... any and all third persons." But no one would seriously contend
11Cheatham v. Tennell's Assignee, 170 Ky. 429, 186 S.W. 128 (1916);
Ross v. Wilson, 70 Ky. 29 (1869); see also: 35 Ky. L.J. 320, 324 et. seq.12 Ross v. Wilson, 70 Ky. 29 (1869).
13 The enactment also provided for procedures for executing, recording and
foreclosing upon chattel mortgages and for a new and separate system of main-
taining records in this regard. Before this there appears to have been no separate
or well-defined procedure provided, and this added to the mortgagee's insecurity.
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that the recorded mortgage would be valid and effective as a defense
against a vendee of mortgaged property who sued his vendor for
breach of warranty of clear title. Who would argue that it would be
effective against a storage warehouseman who redelivered mortgagee's
property to the mortgagor after default if the mortgagor was the
one who stored it? And are we to assume that a common carrier is to
be liable for conversion if he accepts for shipment property on which
there is a mortgage in default and who has no knowledge of it until
after delivery to its destination?14 Clearly the statute cannot be
interpreted so literally. The above are all clearly understood excep-
tions to the most stringent recording statute. There is another and
equally well-established exception to the usual rule in Kentucky as
in Missouri, 15 Montana,1 6 Oklahoma,' 7 Tennessee, 8 some federal
jurisdictions19 and possibly some other jurisdictions. That exception
is that a factor or commission merchant, who is in the nature of a
public utility20 or public servant required to serve all who seek his
services,21 and who in the ordinary course of business and in good
faith sells goods consigned to him and accounts to the consignor for
the proceeds, will not be liable in conversion to the owner of an
outstanding claim or interest in the goods. Kentucky has even limited
this exception more severely than many other states for here the
exception does not apply where the consignor had no right to pos-
session but was a thief.
22
The rule in Kentucky as established by the Abernathy case is a
good rule. It is sometimes based upon the fact that the recording
statute does not have any effect as against a person who claims no
right or interest in the property. It is frequently justified on the
grounds that the public commission agent, as opposed to more per-
sonal or private agents, cannot choose whom he will serve but must
serve all without discrimination. It would be unjust to require him
14 Shellnut v. Central Ry. of Ga., 131 Ga. 404, 62 S.E. 294 (1908); Nanson
v. Jacob, 93 Mo. 331, 6 S.W. 246 (1887).
15 Cresswell v. Leftridge, 194 S.W. 2d 48 (Mo. App. 1946); Blackwell v.
Laird, 236 Mo. App. 1217, 163 S.W. 2d 91 (1942) (citing Abernathy case).
16 Montana Meat Co. of Helena v. Missoula Livestock Auction Co., 125
Mont. 66, 230 P. 2d 955 (1951).
'7 Kent v. Wright, 198 Okla. 103, 175 P 2d 802 (1946).
3SFargason v. Ball, 28 Tenn. 137, 159 S.W. 221 (1913); Frizzell v. Rundle,
88 Tenn. 396, 12 S.W. 918 (1890); Roach v. Turk, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 708, 24
Am. Rep. 310 (1871).
"9 Drovers Cattle Loan and Investment Co. v. Rice, 10 F. 2d 510 (N.D.
Iowa 1926); Sullivan Co. v. Wells, 89 F. Supp. 317 (Neb. 1950).2 0 Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420 (1930).2
1 KRS 248.350.22 Irvin v. Phelps, 20 Ky. 242, 45 S.W. 659 (1898). Compare Kent v. Wright,
198 Okla. 103, 175 P. 2d 802 (1946); Blackwell v. Laird, 236 Mo. App. 1217,
163 S.W. 2d 91 (1942).
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to serve all and still require him to serve at his risk. Some courts
have based their adherence to this rule on the fact that, like a public
carrier, he is a mere conduit, not asserting any right. Others say
that he is excused because it would not be in the interest of the trade
and the steady flow of commerce to burden the warehouseman or
commission merchant with the duty of carefully checking the title of
each and every consignor, and additionally, force him to bear the
risk that the consignor will state his true name and address which
would be necessary to such a check. Any one of these ,or all together
would be adequate justification of the rule of the Abernathy case.
It is a good rule, and it is still the law in Kentucky. Judge H. Church
Ford recognized this in a case which came before him on the Frank-
fort Docket, U. S. District Court, Eastern District of Kentucky as
recently as Feb. 1, 1954. In that case23 the facts were basically the same
as in the principal case. The defendant warehouse company filed a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and in that motion relied
solely on the Abernathy case. The court, considering the brief sus-
tained the motion and dismissed the case as to the warehouse company.
It must be concluded from this evidence that the court in the
principal case failed to follow the law of Kentucky due to a miscon-
ception as to what that law was. It would be desirable if the Abernathy
case were reaffirmed to preserve a well-reasoned and just exception
to the harsh rule of liability which was established when all agents
and factors selected whom they would serve and when the relation-
ship was purely personal, not public. The exception would do no
violence to the present recording statute.
JAMES H. BYRDWELL
PLEADNGs-KENTuCKY RuLEs OF Civi. lNocDrm -Rui. 8.01-DoS
PLrAD NrG AN ExpnEss CoNTRAcr PEma=r REcomRY UPON AN Ivnr
CoNmAcr?-The plaintiff brought an action to recover on an oral con-
tract for services performed for decedent. The complaint alleged that
the decedent promised "to pay to her or to will or convey to her" cer-
tain real property in consideration of personal services rendered by
the plaintiff to the decedent. The complaint set out in detail the nature
of the services rendered, the circumstances surrounding the agree-
ment, and the plaintiff's performance. There was a demand for a
judgment of $6,500, the alleged reasonable value of the land. The
23 U.S. v. Tilley, Tilley, and Kentuckiana Tobacco Warehouse Co., Civ.
Action 117, Frankfort Docket, Feb. 1, 1954.
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